

# Bell Is Under Pressure To 'Go Easy' on Helms *10/18/77*

By Jack Nelson  
Los Angeles Times

When another VIP tugs at Attorney General Griffin B. Bell's sleeve at a Washington cocktail party these days, chances are it is more than just a friendly greeting.

Frequently it is an appeal to "go easy" on Richard Helms, the former Central Intelligence Agency director who faces possible indictment on a perjury charge for lying to a Senate subcommittee.

The appeals come from journalists as well as politicians, from Democrats as well as Republicans, and from such political heavyweights as Averell Harriman, former New York governor and top federal official in Democratic administrations, and former Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, another former New York governor and a leading Republican for decades.

But Bell, in a lengthy interview, said the almost constant pressure applied by members of the Washington establishment in behalf of Helms will not deter him from "doing my best to vindicate the rule of law."

He said the Helms case is complicated because of the foreign affairs and national security implications, however, and has been difficult to resolve.

Bell hopes to resolve the question of prosecution in that matter and in two other sensitive cases—FBI burglaries and South Korean government influence-peddling among members of Congress—before U.S. District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. becomes FBI director early next year.

As establishment types are pressing Bell on the Helms matter, ordinary citizens are flooding him with mail in an attempt to persuade him to lay off the FBI.

"You wouldn't believe the reservoir of goodwill among the American public for the FBI," said Bell. "I get let-

ters from all over, and they don't want FBI agents prosecuted."

Bell receives many letters from friends who are contemporaries and who served with the FBI during World War II, when some FBI break-ins were justified officially on grounds of national security. "But it was a lot different then," said Bell. "People just don't want to take that into account. Most of them just want to leave the FBI alone now."

As for the Korean scandal, Bell said, there has been little pressure. "Everyone just wants us to get that one over with," he said. "Even the President. They say, 'For God's sakes, finish it.'"

Bell pointed out that he inherited all three of the sensitive cases from the Ford administration and said the investigations did not seem to be going anywhere fast when he took over the Justice Department.

As he accelerated the investigations, the pressure in the Helms and FBI cases increased.


Veteran senators and other political figures who support Helms began to tell Bell that he did not "understand the system."

"They would say, 'You can't indict a man who has had 35 years of public service,'" Bell said.

At a recent party, CBS commentator Eric Sevareid told him, "It would be a shame if Helms is indicted." Bell replied: "I can't talk about that."

Some prominent Washington figures have been more public in their support of Helms. Hugh Sidey, Washington bureau chief of Time Magazine, has passionately defended Helms on television and in speeches.

William E. Simon, who served as Treasury Secretary in the Nixon and Ford administrations, recently stated that a legal defense fund established for ~~FBI agents who might be indicted~~ also would provide money for Helms' legal defense if he were indicted.



**RICHARD HELMS**  
...numerous VIP supporters

Bell, speaking at a Griffin Bell Day ceremony in his hometown of Americus, Ga., the other day, said the predicament he finds himself in concerning the sensitive cases he inherited reminded him of a story he had told President Carter, a story the President later related during a televised press conference.

"It involved a man who was charged with being drunk and setting a bed on fire," Bell said. "When the judge asked him to enter his plea, he said, 'I plead guilty to being drunk, but the bed was on fire when I got into it.'"

Bell also joked about the many stories involving the cases that have been leaked to the news media. He told of a recent Cabinet meeting at which he jokingly commented to Carter that he had ~~nothing~~ to report because most of what he knew was secret. The Attorney General quoted the President as retorting:

"Yeah, I read about your secrets every morning in the newspaper — the KCIA, the Helms case and the FBI cases."

DEC 19, 1978

# The U.S. and Chile: An Ex-Ambassador Speaks Out

By Don Oberdorfer

RIARCLIFF MANOR, N.Y. — Former U.S. Ambassador Edward M. Korry, charging that a Senate committee suppressed important facts and grossly distorted his role in opposing Salvador Allende in Chile, is preparing to sell his house, pack up and move abroad. Because of his loss of faith in this country's political system, he finds it "intolerable" to continue living in the United States.

"I was the only man in all of the U.S. government who was ready to swear under oath, with his death steeched, about the U.S. role in Chile, to provide the documentation, who was ready to account in full, ready to undergo public or executive session interrogation, ready to tell everything. I had no government pension, no ties to any group. I was never a member of any political party. I served three Presidents with equal devotion and dedication," the former official said in the rapid-fire cadences of outrage which have become his accustomed manner.

Why was this knowledgeable and eager witness not permitted to testify to the Senate Intelligence Committee until after its reports on Chile had been written and distributed, and then only briefly? Why was his later day-long executive session testimony — given at his insistence — kept secret by committee vote? Why was he not permitted to go before a federal grand jury as he requested following a lengthy deposition given to Justice Department attorneys?

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee at the time, said the committee had not heard Korry before distributing two Chile reports because the former ambassador had been interviewed by a staff member and submitted a long letter for the record. Korry was heard briefly in public session the day a committee report on covert action in Chile was handed out. According to the committee staff, Korry's subsequent executive hearing was kept secret by senatorial vote, taken by telephone last May 11, after "security objections" to its release were received by the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

The Justice Department told Korry by letter Sept. 30 that he was not being called to testify before a grand jury in order to "protect the integrity of the [Senate] investigation." The Justice Department also said that the United States "had no objection to the United States' sending its chief prosecutor to Chile to conduct its investigation."



United Press International

Chile's President Salvador Allende, left, with Ambassador Edward M. Korry in Santiago in 1971.

was given a one-month suspended sentence and fined \$100 for withholding information about ITT's activities and CIA relationships in Chile from a Senate subcommittee investigating multinational companies.

### Jobless and Bitter

KORRY IS CONVINCED that the stated reasons are subterfuge. "The only reason this has been covered up is that it would tell the honest truth about the political system in the 1960s and 1970s," he charged in an interview.

His statements cannot be dismissed lightly, for he is a man of long experience with politics, government and diplomacy. A United Press and Look magazine correspondent at home and in Europe for two decades, he served with distinction as U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

He has had no success in American scholarship — to say nothing of government — to give it to his version of

After leaving Chile and the U.S. government, Korry was president of the Association of American Publishers and later of the prestigious United Nations Association of the United States. Since the spring of 1974, when controversy over the U.S. role in Chile began to widen, Korry has been unemployed and, he maintains, unemployable in his chosen fields of journalism and public service.

Today he lives a spartan and largely isolated life in a restored 1740s house in this fashionable Westchester County suburb, reviewing and rethinking what he saw, heard and wrote in Chile and its aftermath. Sitting on the edge of an overstuffed chair at pacing the large bedroom-study, this tall balding man backs up his charges with citations from a clutter of files, books, memoranda, draft hook chapters and notes which he has laboriously taken to and from his typewriter.

He has had no success in American scholarship — to say nothing of government — to give it to his version of

the disputed U.S.-Chilean historical record, in which he is depicted as the sponsor of a covert campaign against Allende. Late in November the *Washington Post*, News Journal published a lengthy article based on Korry's charges, and another is planned.

Reports of the Senate Intelligence Committee, extensively covered in the press, attributed to Korry political planning and economic pressure against Allende. The committee cited a Korry recommendation to the State Department and CIA prior to the 1970 Chilean election, including a contingency plan for a "\$500,000 effort" to convince members of the Chilean congress not to vote Allende into office. (The money was never spent, and the congress did elect Allende after a won a plurality in a three-way race in the general election.) Korry was also quoted as warning Chileans that if Allende came to power, U.S. economic reprisals would "conquer the country to deprivation and poverty."

Korry does not deny the authenticity of the documents which cited him, nor does he deny that he and his embassy played a role in seeking to prevent the election of Allende by the Chilean public. He charges, however, that these and other documents were taken out of context and mixed with half-truths, selective reporting and some outright lies by the Senate committee and press commentators, adding up to "a false view of history."

The popular conception that Allende was a "democratic socialist" brought down by U.S. covert pressures and operations is "a myth," Korry declared. In his view, Allende was an erratic and untrustworthy figure of the radical left, brought down in the end by his own rigidity and by the failure of the Soviet Union to give him necessary support. Korry said U.S. activities against Allende declined substantially in the period of his ambassadorship, rather than increasing as is often believed.

### The Roots of Involvement

THE STARTING POINT for a true understanding of the Chilean drama, according to Korry, is the deep, poorly reported and sometimes "misled" involvement of the United States in the domestic affairs of Chile during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

President Kennedy and his White House staff decided in 1962 that it was in the U.S. national interest to elect the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, as president of Chile in 1964 rather than the Marxist Allende or a rightist candidate, Korry said. This decision, he maintained, was arrived at not only through regular foreign policy channels "but also because it responded to the direct appeals of Roman Catholic prelates in both Rome and Santiago."

Following Kennedy's decision, "tens of millions of dollars" in U.S. foreign aid funds, as well as smaller amounts of CIA covert money, were funneled to Jesuit organizations in Chile "for the expressed purpose of electing the Christian Democrats." Among other evidence of this, Korry cited Agency for International Development funds provided to the Jesuit Center for Research and Social Action and the 1965 AID "policy and action paper" for Latin America. Korry quoted that document as saying, "U.S. assistance to Chile during 1963 and 1964, the presidential election years, was designed as a holding operation and to develop a political climate conducive to Frei's victory."

Dwarfing the official aid, according to Korry, was more than \$400 million in investments by U.S. multinational companies promised to Chile prior to the 1964 election on condition that Frei be elected and that U.S. financial guarantees be provided against expropriation. The most important firms proposing to invest, and later

of Kennedy and Johnson, the reputation of the Democratic Party and others involved.

### The Case Against Allende

KORRY DOES NOT feel that U.S. opposition to Allende's election in 1970 was unjustified. Charging that "his [Allende's] closest cronies were paid agents of the Castro government for many years," Korry portrayed Allende as highly unreliable, devious and extremist in his views. As U.S. ambassador to Chile, Korry said, he was getting "extremely accurate information" from the CIA, including "an absolutely accurate summary of the plenary meetings of the Communist Party of Chile." Through these sources, Korry said, he knew that Allende planned to repudiate more than \$1 billion in U.S. loans and take other drastic actions.

According to Korry, Soviet copper technicians were visiting Chilean mines at which U.S. interests were being nationalized at the very time — the spring of 1971 — when Allende as president was telling Korry that he would "never" permit Russians near those mines. Despite some close ties and plans for others, Korry maintains, the Soviet Union sealed Allende's downfall by rejecting his request for \$500 million in aid in November, 1972, advising him to make his peace with the United States and passing word of this decision to U.S. officials.

Korry portrays his role in the political maneuverings surrounding Allende's election in 1970 as a complicated one aimed at protecting U.S. taxpayer and strategic interests in Chile through "minimum" campaign of pressure and covert action, while staying off demands from President Nixon, multinational corporations and others for much stronger and more dangerous measures.

As U.S. ambassador, Korry said, he planned much of the 1970 CIA covert action in Chile. He maintained that the total U.S. expenditure to influence the campaign was "a terribly minor matter" of \$400,000 in "standard anti-Communist propaganda for the most part." There were also about \$35,000 in continuing payoffs to a Chilean politician who had helped in 1964 and "a few thousand dollars" spent on a "spying operation" to create dissension within Allende's Socialist Party.

The former ambassador said he recommended the authority for payoffs in case Allende's election was contested within the Chilean congress and votes "go on the auction block." The secret U.S. "Committee" ultimately approved \$250,000 for this effort to thwart the Allende victory by congressional maneuver. Korry said he rec-

*"The only reason this has been covered up is that it would tell the honest truth about the political system in the 1960s and 1970s."*

Organized as the Business Group for Latin America (now the Council for Latin America), the multinational thing "wore for the first time systematically integrated into U.S. government covert operations and planning throughout the Americas," Korry charged. He said this relationship "legitimized the passing of money for political purposes by multinational corporations at the suggestion and with the cooperation of the CIA and under the direct leadership of the White House."

The total impact of U.S. foreign aid, covert CIA payments, and investments and other activities of multinational firms was far more important to Frei's victory in 1964 than anything attempted in the 1970 election when Allende won, according to Korry. But he cited that less has been said about the 1960s in order to protect the names

used the money and did not take the action suggested because it became clear the maneuver could not succeed.

Korry produced extensive quotations from embassy cables to show that he strongly opposed U.S. participation in the plotting of military coups aimed at preventing Allende from taking office after he had been elected. Though he suspected U.S. involvement at the time, he said he learned only last year from Senate committee aides that Nixon had authorized coup plotting, with instructions to the CIA that this be kept secret from Korry.

Some of Korry's cables also show that, immediately after Allende's election, he suggested an economic campaign to weaken Allende by withholding private bank credits and having a large U.S. bank in Chile go out of business. A cable also suggested that the government consider blocking Chilean assets in the United States to use against Allende.

Such measures, Korry said, were "within the tolerable limits of the time" and less dangerous than plotting military coups. After Allende took office, Korry added, he took the lead in seeking to negotiate with the Chilean leader "genuinely, generously and compassionately."

Along with his wife, Pat, the granddaughter of a former New York governor and a direct descendant of Benjamin Franklin, Korry is putting his spacious old house in order and preparing his voluminous files for a permanent move. "I'm like a man with terminal cancer, whose only recourse is to donate his body for the cure," he said in a reflective moment, referring to his crusade to tell the story as he sees it, despite the impact this has had on his friendships and his fortunes.

Unless there's a change of plans, he intends to take his case abroad early next year in search of European scholars who will listen. The 54-year-old former official said he will never come back to America, except for funerals and family requirements, if he can find satisfaction overseas.

*Oberdorfer is a diplomatic correspondent with The Post's national news staff.*



Edward M. Korry